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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the effects of privatization and non-ownership-change reforms on firms’ 
productivity in China. As one of the most prominent empirical challenges in China privatization 
studies, endogeneity problems are addressed with a first-difference instrumental variable GMM 
estimation. We find that privatization does not improve firms’ productivity immediately. Instead, 
its effects become significantly positive in the year after conversion. In addition, partial 
privatization fails to lead to improved efficiency whereas insider privatization boosts firms’ 
productivity shortly after the first year of privatization but the effects quickly fade after two years 
of privatization. Lastly, all non-ownership-change reforms, except leasing, are proved to be 
ineffective even when issues like social burdens, worker redundancy, management incentives and 
soft-budget constraint are tackled before the restructuring.    
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1. Introduction 
While privatization has gained popularity as a remedy to aid failing state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) across the world, the process of privatization in China has always 
been gradual and cautious. Such a gradualism approach is largely attributed to the fear 
that the government may lose control of the country’s economy if SOEs are massively 
privatized. Therefore, unlike reforms of SOEs undertaken in the former Soviet Union and 
Eastern European blocks, Chinese government has taken a more comprehensive approach 
to improve efficiencies at its SOEs. This approach includes ownership change, namely 
privatization and reforms without relinquishing state controls. To shed light on the effects 
of this hybrid restructuring strategy on Chinese firms’ efficiencies, this paper uses a 
Chinese firm-level panel data to examine the effects of privatization and non-ownership 
restructurings on firm’s productivity in China. A study on privatization in China is 
warranted given that most current literature has focused on the merits of privatization 
process in Central and Eastern European countries where privatization has mostly yielded 
significantly positive effects on firms’ performances. Moreover, a study on China’s SOE 
restructuring may also add new evidence and insight to the existing body of literature on 
firms’ efficiency in transition economies. Lastly, the effects of partial privatization or 
reforms without compromising state controls, such as leasing and employee shareholding 
etc., on SOEs have not been extensively examined by researchers as the effect of 
privatization.  
 
The empirical research on Chinese SOE reform has faced several hurdles. First, 
Chinese firm-level data with sufficient information on reform and ownership structures 
has largely not been available. This data constraint is mainly caused by the policies 
adopted by the Chinese government to privatize its SOEs. Even though the economic 
reform started as early as 1980, the sale of SOEs was meagerly allowed until 1995. 
Therefore, previous studies of Chinese privatization have been hindered either by too 
short time period to be adequate for time series analysis or by too few numbers of 
privatized SOEs to be adequate for cross sectional analysis.  Utilizing a more recent 
dataset with a longer time span and larger sample size of privatized SOEs, this paper 
should be able to ascertain the restructuring effects more reliably than previous studies. 
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Second, endogeneity problem has been well documented in most research on 
Chinese privatization. The persistence of this problem may come from two sources. One 
is selection bias due to the fact that Chinese SOEs have been deliberately selected by the 
government for different restructuring strategies. Yao (2005) find that better-performing 
SOEs are more likely to be chosen for privatization. Thus, when one attempts to examine 
the impacts of SOEs restructuring on their efficiencies in China, the findings may not be 
warranted as robust or reliable if the selection bias is not sufficiently addressed. Second, 
the endogeneity problem may also arise when firms modify their production behavior in 
anticipation of future ownership changes or restructuring. For example, firms may 
attempt to be more productive if future privatization is anticipated. By doing so, they may 
attract higher bids from private investors. If this “anticipation effect” does exist, then a 
general panel data treatment, such as a within or first-differenced estimator, may violate 
the strictly exogenous condition for panel estimation. To address these two sources of 
endogeneity, this paper proposes a first-differenced instrumental variables general 
method of moments (IV-GMM) approach. With this approach, the selection bias can be 
controlled by introducing several exogenous instrumental variables (IVs) whereas the 
violation of strictly exogenous condition in a panel setting can be eased by estimating a 
first-differenced model with lagged value of the chosen IVs. Moreover, firms’ 
performances in the pre-privatization periods are later used to facilitate a specification 
test to examine if the endogeneity problems have been effectively controlled with the IV 
GMM estimation.  
 
Third, an omitted variable problem may also arise if a firm’s current production 
level is correlated with its manager’s or local government’s previous expectation of its 
future ownership changes. For instance, if privatization is expected to occur in the future, 
the managers may not only adjust the firm’s current production but also change the firms’ 
future production strategies accordingly. As a result, failing to consider the impacts of 
managers’ current expectations of a firm’s future restructuring on its future production 
may cause an omitted variable problem. By using the lagged values of instrumental 
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variables to estimate managers’ expectation of future ownership change this paper may 
adequately address this omitted variable problem.     
The focus of this paper is to examine the effects of privatization and other non-
ownership restructuring strategies on Chinese firms’ productivity growth. The empirical 
results show that privatization may not yield significantly positive results on firms’ 
productivity growth immediately but only until one year after privatization takes place. It 
is found that firms’ productivity growth may increase as much as 214 percent in the first 
year after privatization. In addition, other reform measures also affect firms’ productivity 
growth significantly and the effects of these reform measures appear to be more 
immediate than those of privatization. Downsizing of the number of retired workers and 
excessive debt are found to boost productivity growth, on average, by 37.3 and 5.2 
percents respectively in the same year of reform. Hardening budget constraint is found to 
only have marginal impacts on firms’ productivity growth, but the effects are positive and 
significant. Moreover, the effects of partial privatization on firms’ productivity growth 
are also estimated. The results indicate that partial privatization induces no significant 
effects on productivity growth. This may imply that introducing private ownership to 
SOEs cannot improve firms’ efficiency unless private shares exceed the 50 percent 
threshold. Furthermore, to investigate how various types of private ownerships affect 
productivity growth in former SOEs, privatized firms are further disaggregated into 
insider and outsider or domestic and foreign owned. Insider privatization shows 
significantly positive effects on firms’ productivity growth; yet no significant changes are 
found for other forms of privatization.  
 
Lastly, this paper also obtains some insights on the optimal sequencing for non-
ownership restructuring. Without first taking step to harden soft-budget constraints 
properly and to reduce excessive debts at SOEs, all non-ownership restructuring attempts 
appear to be in vain. However, leasing SOEs to managers or private investors seems to 
increase productivity growth by 55 percent on average if soft-budget constraint and 
excessive debt are eased.  
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The reminder of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section reviews the 
theoretical and empirical literature of privatization and more specifically those related to 
the reform in China. Section 3 provides a brief historical background of Chinese 
privatization. Section 4 describes the data set used in this paper. Section 5 explains the 
econometric methodologies used and the empirical results are discussed in Section 6. 
Section 7 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Privatization has been widely used by governments in the world today to resolve 
the impending failure or improve the performance of SOEs. Megginson and Netter (2001) 
and Djankov and Murrell (2002) provide comprehensive surveys on the current 
development of theoretical and empirical studies on privatization. Their work focuses 
more on the privatization that took place in the “transition economies”.
1
  
 
2.1 Theoretical Literature on Privatization 
The economic theory of privatization could be categorized into two branches: The 
Public Interest Theory and the Principal-Agent Theory 2 . Public interest theories 
emphasize the effectiveness of SOEs to solve market failure caused by private firms in an 
unregulated oligopoly market. In contrast, Principal-Agent theories tend to address 
productive inefficiency of SOEs arising from asymmetric information.  
 
Public Interest theories state that “Political intervention can help when markets 
fail, provided that the cure does not cost more than the disease”.
3
 In other words, a SOE 
may be better than a private firm in improving social welfare by allocating resources 
more efficiently. Public ownership leads a SOE to take account of not only profit but also 
consumer surplus that a private firm is inclined to ignore. Therefore, in a natural 
monopoly market, private ownership would be biased toward setting a higher price. As a 
consequence, the gain of social welfare from cost reduction might be offset by the loss 
                                                 
1 formerly socialist countries or communist countries undertaking economic reforms 
2 See Vickers and Yarrow (1988) 
3 See Willner (2003), page 61. 
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caused by market failure. Willner (2003) proposes a theoretical model which starts with a 
monopolistic public firm. This public firm maximizes a social welfare function. To 
compare the change in social welfare under a private firm setting, he also considers the 
case that the public firm is replaced by an n-firm Cournot oligopoly. The comparison of 
the social welfare under different types of ownership shows that public ownership doesn’t 
necessarily imply inefficiency. Actually, private ownership might lend to social welfare 
improvement over public ownership only when the cost reduction it induces exceeds a 
certain threshold. In addition, Shapiro and Willig (1990) and Vickers and Yarrow (1988) 
also investigate the advantages of public ownership over private ownership. 
 
The Principal-Agent theories, on the other hand, weight more on the SOE’s 
internal inefficiency which is primarily caused by asymmetric information between the 
residual claimant and the manager of the firm. It argues that the principal-agent problem 
can’t be sovled without transferring public ownership to private owners, as SOEs are 
unable to eliminate this internal inefficiency by themselves. On the contrary, with the 
introduction of certain regulations, the merits of private firms may persist and social 
welfare would be improved after privatization. Principal-Agent theories can be classified 
into two complementary approaches which differ by modeling who plays the role of the 
agent, a politician or a manager.  
 
The Principal-Agent theory with a politician being the agent stresses the 
interference from the politician. SOE may be used to fulfill some personal objectives of 
that politician, for example, over-employment and election wins rather than social 
welfare maximization. Shleifer and Vishny (1994) and Boycko et al. (1996) develop a 
principal-agent model with three players: treasury, politician and manager. In their model, 
the treasury is concerned with profit and controls cash flow; the politician responds to 
voters’ needs (more jobs available) and is able to help the SOE get subsidies; the 
manager maximizes profits and bribes politicians in the hope of receiving more subsidies 
from the state but carrying less burden of the cost of employment. Since the treasury 
doesn’t have full information on the firm’s profit, the politician can help the manager to 
conceal profit and ask for more subsidies in exchange for more employment. Thus, 
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inefficiency of the SOE occurs because of asymmetric information and that the transfer 
of information is costly. Arin and Okten (2003) adopt similar model to examine the 
effects of privatization on firm’s efficiency and disparities in technology adoption 
between public and private firms. They show that privatization reduces unit cost and that 
public firms prefer to maintain labor-intensive technology.  
 
Differing from the politician theory, the Principal-Agent with manager theory 
considers a typical principal-agent problem which only involves state (principal) and 
manager (agent). In this type of model, the state is the residual claimant and determines 
the reward to be given to the manager. However, the state is poorly informed about the 
firm’s performance. The manager, on the other hand, decides how hard he (or she) wants 
to work and has full knowledge of how well the firm is doing. Vickers and Yarrow (1988) 
first explore this scheme of the principal-agent problem. Bös and Peters (1991) add 
uncertainty and external control into the model. They find that the SOE would be 
competitive in terms of cost reduction only when the state of the economy is good.   
 
With regard to theoretical analysis of Chinese privatization, there are very few 
studies in the literature. Zhang (1997) models the effects of reform on the performance of 
a Chinese SOE. He finds that shifting decision rights and residual claims from the state to 
the manager and hardening budget constraints can motive the manager to work hard and 
thus lead to better performance. He concludes that further improvement of efficiency 
depends on privatization of the state enterprises.  
 
2.2 Empirical Literature on Privatization 
Regarding the effect of privatization in transition economies, Brown et al. (2006) 
presents the most comprehensive empirical analysis of the effects of privatization on the 
firms’ productivity in four former communist countries, Russia, Ukraine, Romania and 
Hungary. They take into account the firm-specific effect and firm-specific time trend 
effect. They conclude that while the effects of privatization differ in magnitudes across 
these four nations, the results are robust in that privatization significantly increases 
productivity in all nations. Moreover, they also find that firms privatized by foreign 
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investors achieve more sustainable growth in productivity than those privatized by 
domestic investors. This paper applies their methodologies to a Chinese dataset. 
Comparison of the results from this study and theirs may shed light on how the effects of 
privatization differ across countries adopting different transition strategies.  
 
Turning to the empirical literature on privatization reform in China, Jefferson 
and Singh (1999) offer a comprehensive review of industrial SOEs’ reform and 
privatization process in China. Cao (2000) provides a chronology of Chinese 
privatization since 1978. She also evaluates the consequences of the reform policies that 
China had adopted during the ownership transition of SOEs. Lin et al. (1998) discuss 
several issues associated with the managerial and ownership reform of China’s SOEs. 
They conclude that without the easing of policy burdens and the removal of the soft 
budget constraint, there is little prospect for SOEs to achieve better performance. Dong 
and Putterman (2003) study the effect of hardening the budget constraint on the 
redundant labor problem in Chinese SOEs and find that unlike in developed economies
4
, 
hardening budget constraint in China only results in an increase in redundant labor if the 
firms’ social burdens are not lessened.  
 
Jefferson and Su (2006), Xu et al. (2005) and Song and Yao (2006) also study the 
effectiveness of Chinese privatization on firm performance. Using a large panel data of 
Chinese SOEs, Jefferson and Su (2005) find that a larger non-state share improves the 
performance of firms. However, the lack of share structure information in their data 
limits the reliability of their conclusions. Analyzing a national survey of the ownership 
reform of industrial SOEs in China, Xu et al. (2005) reach several interesting conclusions. 
In particular, they find that the success of reform positively correlates with reduced 
political control affording the firms more flexibility in labor deployment.  Song and Yao 
(2004) use the same dataset as being used here to address the effects of privatization on 
firm performance. Nonetheless, this study differs from theirs in two ways. First, in 
addition to controlling the firm-specific effect as they did, this study also considers the 
                                                 
4They compare the SOEs’ reform in Italian to that in China. 
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firm-specific time trend. Second, they did not distinguish the effects of privatization 
associated with different types of private ownership whereas this study does.  
Finally, Dong et al. (2002) study the impacts of share ownership reform on 
employee attitudes in China’s privatized rural industries. Qi and Zhang (2000) use firm 
data from the Chinese stock market to address how changes in the shareholding structure 
can affect the performance of stock exchange listed companies. 
 
3. Privatization in China 
 
While the reform of SOEs in China began in 1978, a considerable amount of 
privatization of small and medium size SOEs did not take hold until middle of the1990s. 
Unlike the massive privatization which occurred in Eastern European countries, China 
initially took a comparatively slow and gradual approach to proceed with privatization. 
The primary goal of the Chinese government in privatizing some SOEs was to improve 
the efficiency of those firms rather than to reduce the influence of the government on 
firm operations. However, later on, the privatization process picked up speed gradually 
and apparently, the central government also showed strong support for privatization in 
certain industrial sectors and for certain size firms. This reconstruction of SOEs’ 
ownership is not only open to domestic private firms but also to qualified foreign firms 
allowing them to buy a certain percentage of the shares of SOEs. The trend of this 
privatization process is more obvious by viewing Table 2. In 1995, only 3.52 percent of 
firms in the sample had been privatized. However, in 2001, over 20 percent of firms had 
been privatized.  
 
The Chinese privatization process can be viewed as unfolding in three stages. The 
first stage began in the early 1980s. That was the period when China started to 
experiment with a new economic system in which a non-state sector was created to 
coexist with the state sector. The new non-state sector, though very small, indeed 
manifested the benefits of privatization, such as quick response to the change of the 
market and more efficient operation. However, the success of the newly created 
privatized firms did not lead to a broader scale of privatization in the economy. The 
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second stage began in the early 1990s. The Chinese government launched a series of 
measures to reform the SOEs. This industrial reform tried to inject a system of 
managerial incentives to improve enterprise efficiency without altering the state 
dominance in ownership of enterprises. Li (1997) shows that by injecting incentives and 
decentralizing the economic decision-making process, the total factor productivity was 
improved dramatically. The third stage began in mid 1990s. That was when the Chinese 
government implemented an aggressive privatization program guided by a policy called 
“retain the large, release the small”, which is to retain only 300 or so largest SOEs and 
privatize the rest. However, even though the scale of this privatization program is 
remarkable, the Chinese government did not actually “release the small” but rather 
retained substantial influence on these privatized firms. Megginson and Netter (2001) and 
Lin (2000) point out that for most of the so-called “privatized” firms, the government is 
still the biggest share-holder, and that less than one-third of the shares of those firms are 
sold to private investors. In addition, the goal of this stage (stage three) is not only to 
improve the efficiency of SOEs but also to develop the security market in China. Thus, 
the effect of this privatization effort is still unclear and is the interest of this study.   
 
4. Data Description 
 
4.1 Selected performance and production factors 
This paper uses the data from Song and Yao (2004), which is based on a survey 
conducted by International Finance Corporation and National Bureau of Statistics in 2002. 
This survey includes 863 firms in 11 cities with information on accounting, employment 
and the corporation governance.
5
 The gross value of total output, unit cost and 
profitability are chosen to measure performance changes of Chinese SOEs during the 
sample periods. The gross value of total output is adjusted for inflation with 1995 price 
index as the base year. Unit cost is considered in order to capture the effort exerted by the 
managers on cost reduction. It is reflected by the percentage of managerial and 
operational costs over total value of output. Profitability is defined as return to assets 
                                                 
5 These 11 cities are Harbin, Fushun, Tangshan, Xining, Lanzhou, Chengdu, Guiyang, Weifang, Zhenjiang, Huangshi 
and Hengyang.  
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which is the percentage of the pre-tax profit over the total value of assets.  Table 1 
presents the descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) of these performance 
indicators as well as two major input variables, namely total number of on-duty 
employees and total value of assets over the period of 1995 to 2001. A clear declining 
trend in labor usage can be observed over years and this may be attributable to various 
reform efforts. It is also notable that the average gross value of total output for sampled 
firms has increased from 29 to 38 million Chinese Yuan. However, there is no sign 
indicating any improvements on the average profitability among the sampled firms. It 
shows that on average firms have faced negative return to asset from 1995 to 2001. Such 
negative profitability may be attributed to the ever-increasing competition in the market. 
Lastly, the trends of changes in average unit cost and capital are rather mixed.  
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Performance and Input Variables in the Sample 
Year Output Unit Cost Profitability     Labor Capital 
1995 29.08 1.43 -0.05 680.78 45.01 
 (43.78) (2.85) (0.12) (1057.79) (59.17) 
1996 31.44 1.35 -0.06 658.64 55.17 
 (46.25) (0.87) (0.08) (1026.17) (68.91) 
1997 32.03 1.99 -0.06 632.75 59.71 
 (51.50) (6.32) (0.08) (1030.09) (73.93) 
1998 31.38 2.02 -0.07 588.78 63.90 
 (49.33) (4.08) (0.09) (1120.07) (78.59) 
1999 33.22 4.31 -0.06 544.63 62.68 
 (56.11) (40.37) (0.08) (1076.15) (76.39) 
2000 32.32 2.18 -0.06 492.10 58.48 
 (52.39) (6.03) (0.11) (985.02) (71.58) 
2001 37.84 3.25 -0.06 463.73 59.61 
 (37.84) (18.06) (0.10) (1023.18) (74.92) 
Average 
Sample Size 
426 390 396 573 517 
 
Note: Sample size is expressed in the unit of the number of firms. Output equals the value of gross output 
and is measured in Chinese currency (unit: million Yuan). It is adjusted by the ex-factory price indices of 
industrial products (year 1995 is chosen as the base year). Unit cost is the ratio of operation cost (total sales 
minus pretax profit) over total sales. Profitability is measured by the ratio of pretax profit over total asset. 
Labor equals the number of working employees. Capital equals the value of total asset and is measured in 
Chinese currency (unit: 10,000 Yuan). It is also adjusted with price indexes. Standard Deviations are shown 
in the parenthesis. 
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4.2 Ownership distributions 
The construction of ownership variables follows the standard procedure in the 
literature on privatization in the transition economies (Brown et al (2006) and Song and 
Yao (2004) etc.), in which a firm is defined as a privatized firm if the shares owned by 
the state are less than 50 percent, otherwise a firm is considered to be a SOE. While the 
data includes the year of conversion, it does not provide information on the specific date 
of the occurrence. Thus, we assume that a privatization normally begins at the beginning 
of the year of conversion and is completed at the end of that year. 6  
 
The summary statistics of the ownership changes are displayed in Table 2. It 
concurs with the literature which indicates that the privatization process merely started in 
China in 1995 and began to accelerate significantly after 1997.  By the end of the sample 
period, privately owned firms account for 21 percent in the whole sample. Among the 
privatized SOEs, 97 percent are privatized by domestic investors. These investors may 
include top and middle managers, ordinary employees, domestic private firms, or legal 
persons (entities). In contrast, foreign investors are still facing strict limitation from 
participating in the Chinese SOE privatization process. In 2001, the percentage of firms 
owned by foreign investors even declined to 0.52 percent. In addition, the percentage of 
firms privatized by insiders has surged from 0.29 percent in 1995 to 13 percent in 2001. 
Insiders may include managers from various levels and ordinary employees (the rank and 
files). On the other hand, privatization initiated by outsiders, who may include legal 
persons, domestic private firms, and foreign firms, has moderately increased from 3 to 8 
percents during the sample period. It seems that domestic and insider privatizations have 
gained more popularity among SOEs as paths toward privatization.   
  
                                                 
6 The actual transfer of the share of privatized firms may take months or years to complete. (Megginson and Netter 
(2001)). 
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Table 2 Ownership Distributions in the Sample (in percentage), from 1995 to 2001  
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Private total 3.52 3.41 3.97 7.32 10.3 15.78 20.73 
Domestic 2.64 2.84 3.4 6.76 9.49 14.97 20.21 
Foreign 0.88 0.57 0.57 0.56 0.81 0.8 0.52 
Insider 0.29 0.57 1.13 2.54 4.07 9.09 12.86 
Outsider 3.23 2.84 2.83 4.79 6.23 6.68 7.87 
Note: This table shows the ownership distribution in the sample data. All values are in percentage. 
Private total refers to the percentage of all private firms; domestic refers to firms privatized by 
domestic private owners; foreign stands for firms privatized by foreign investors; insider refers to 
firms owned by their own employees and managers; outsider refers to firms whose majority shares 
are sold to outside investors. 
 
4.3 Non-ownership-change restructurings 
Chinese central government has always preferred to improving SOEs productive 
efficiency without further compromising state controls in SOEs. As a result, before 
privatization was officially endorsed, most of Chinese SOEs have gone through a variety 
of non-ownership reforms. Most of the non-ownership reforms are aimed at clarifying or 
reallocating property rights over firms’ assets and liabilities. Garnaut et al. (2005) 
identify seven major forms of restructuring in China. These restructuring efforts include 
initial public offering (IPO), internal restructuring, bankruptcy, employee shareholding, 
open sales, leasing and joint venture. 
 
If a firm chooses to take IPO, employee shareholding, open sales or joint venture, 
it may become private-owned. Thus, we will only consider internal restructuring, 
bankruptcy and leasing as non-ownership-change reforms in this paper. Internal 
restructuring refers to incorporation in the context of Chinese SOE reform. This reform 
does not change the ownership of a firm, but forces it to verify its legal ownership. 
During years of reform, SOEs are required to convert themselves into either limited 
liability (small SOEs) or limited liability shareholding companies (large SOEs). After 
Bankruptcy Law came into effect in 1988, Chinese SOEs are now allowed to claim 
bankruptcy. As Garnaut et al. (2005) show, bankruptcy policy has been widely abused by 
poorly performing SOEs as a tool to evade debt payments. When an investor cannot 
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afford to privatize a SOE, he (she) would most likely choose to lease the SOE. Leasing 
does not change a firm’s ownership, but it often gives the management or the lease holder 
more autonomy to operate the business.  
 
Table 3 presents the percentage of firms in the sample that have at least taken one 
form of restructuring. Within the sample, some firms have undergone more than one 
round of restructuring. However, to identify the effects of different restructuring on firms’ 
productivity growth, this study only considers the first round of reform that a firm ever 
took.  Table 3 shows that the non-ownership-change reform process has also gained 
momentum after 1995. There were only 1.47 percent of the sampled firms ever 
undertaking a restructuring in 1995 whereas 61.34 percent of firms have taken at least 
one round non-ownership-change reform by the end of 2001. Among all non-ownership-
change restructuring policies, internal restructuring is the most popular one. By the end of 
2001, 32.44 percent of SOEs have been incorporated. Bankruptcy and leasing appear 
equally attractive as reforms proceed. 12.89 and 16.01 percents of SOEs have chosen 
bankruptcy or leasing respectively in 2001. However, leasing has become more appealing 
to SOEs than bankruptcy after 1997. 
 
Table 3 Non-ownership-change Restructuring Distributions (in percentage), from 
1995 to 2001 
  1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total 
Reform total 1.47 5.11 7.36 8.45 12.2 12.84 13.91 61.34 
Internal restructuring 0.88 1.7 3.68 5.35 7.05 7.22 6.56 32.44 
Bankruptcy 0 2.27 2.55 1.41 1.63 2.14 2.89 12.89 
Lease 0.59 1.14 1.13 1.69 3.52 3.48 4.46 16.01 
Note: This table shows the non-ownership-change reform distributions in the sample from 1995 to 2001. Reform total 
indicates the percentage of sampled firms that have undergone a non-ownership-change restructuring. All values are in 
percentages.  
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5. Endogeneity and Model Specifications 
 
5.1 The sources of endogeneity 
A typical estimation on impacts of privatization on firms’ productivity can be 
specified as the following. 
 
(1) 
itiityritwitititit
uyearwprivkly εβββββ ++++++= ''
321
 
 
Where 
it
y  is logarithm of the gross value of total output and 
it
l and 
it
k  are the total 
number of on-duty workers and total value of assets in logarithm, respectively. 
it
priv
stands for ownership dummy. It takes the value of 1 if the percentage of total private 
shares in a firm exceeds 50 and equals 0 otherwise. 
it
w  is a vector which represents other 
determinants of a firm’s efficiency in China. It includes managers’ incentive, degree of 
social burden, degree of soft budget constraint, and excessive debt. Managers’ incentive 
is measured by the percentage of total shares owned by top and middle managers; the 
ratio of number of retirees to the total number of employees is used to measure social 
burden; soft budget constraint is constructed as the ratio between the value of current 
overdue loans and the total value of loss (in negative term) in the previous year. The 
higher this value is the less degree of soft-budget constraint a firm may face; excessive 
debt is calculated as the sum of overdue loans and overdue interest payment at the year-
end. Lastly, 
it
u  stands for the fixed-effects and 
it
ε is a Gaussian error term. 
 
The estimation of Equation (1) requires extra caution because endogeneity 
problem may occur. In this particular study, as stated earlier, endogeneity may come from 
several sources. First, selection bias may arise if the decision of a firm’s privatization 
partially depends on some variables related to the firm’s performance, but unobservable 
to researchers. That is, 
it
priv and
it
ε may be positively correlated. This correlation may be 
caused by some time-invariant variables. Such time-invariant variables may include 
locations, industries or the relationships between management and local officials. A fairly 
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straightforward panel data transformation procedure can remove these time-invariant 
effects. Thus, we take first-difference of Equation (1) to remove the fixed-effects 
it
u . 
 
(2) )(')()()(
11312111 −−−−−
−+−+−+−=−
ititwitititititititit
wwprivprivkkllyy ββββ  
    )()('
11 −−
−+−+
itititityr
yearyear εεβ  
 
However, it is also possible that some unobserved variables may be time-variant. 
For example, the quality of a manager’s managerial skills may likely influence a firm’s 
privatization decision as well as its performance. Since better performing SOEs are more 
likely chosen for privatization, 
it
ε  will continue to be positively correlated with 
it
priv  
and an upward bias will persist in the estimated coefficients. Second, a firm’s current 
performance may also affect its future privatization decision, which suggests that
it
ε may 
be correlated with 
1+itpriv , a firm’s ownership status in the next period. In that event, the 
strictly exogenous condition for panel data estimation is violated and a new source of 
endogeneity is introduced after first-differencing Equation (1). To be specific, term 
)(
1−
−
itit
privpriv becomes more correlated with new error term )(
1−
−
itit
εε because they 
include terms 
it
priv and 
1−it
ε . Given that a better performance in the previous year may 
raise people’s expectation for privatization in the next period, this bias will also generate 
upwardly biased coefficients. Lastly, poorly reported value for asset and output may 
introduce measurement error into our regression. Measurement error tends to bias the 
values of estimated coefficients toward zero.  
 
To control for the endogeneity problems caused by selection bias, first-
differencing, and measurement error, this paper adopts an instrumental variable 
estimation. Equation (2) is thus considered as the main model specification in this study 
and privatization dummy will be treated as an endogenous variable. 
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5.2 The choice of instrumental variables 
How to choose instrumental variables is a daunting task for researchers because a 
qualified instrumental variable has to meet two requirements. First, it must be relevant to 
the included endogenous variable. If the instrumental variables are not or only weakly 
correlated with the endogenous variable, Equation (2) may become unidentified. Second, 
the instrumental variable must be distributed independently of the error term in Equation 
(2). If it fails to be orthogonal to the error term, the endogeneity issue will reemerge in 
Equation (2). Therefore, we need to carefully weigh our choices of instrumental variables 
based on these two criteria: relevance and orthogonality.  
 
To find instruments relevant to the privatization dummy, one needs to examine 
the privatization process in China closely. Privatization in China is mainly driven by the 
central government policies. After several failed attempts to revive the performance of 
ill-managed SOEs without giving up state controls, the central government began to 
advocate a “grasping the large and letting go of the small” policy since 1996. The 
adoption of this policy is grounded on a realization that with the ever-increasing market 
competition it becomes very costly for the government to continue to subsidize smaller 
SOEs operating in some less important, but very competitive markets.  
 
Although the implementation of this policy has been mostly ambiguous, Mattlin 
(2007) and Yao (2005) examine several hypotheses on causes of privatization. They find 
that the causes leading to a firm’s privatization in China can be summarized as the 
followings. First, a SOE’s current performance is an important factor for the state to 
decide whether to privatize it or not. Local governments have incentives to privatize 
better-performing SOE first because doing so may help them to ease their budgetary 
restraints and maintain the momentum for future reforms. Second, workforce redundancy 
at a firm may hinder its privatization process. One of the most prominent concerns for the 
Chinese government in prompting SOE restructuring is the potential massive layoffs and 
its resulting social unrest. Therefore, firms with more redundant workers may have a 
lower probability of propensity to be privatized. Third, market competition is found to 
have significant influence on a firm’s privatization tendency. Firms operating in a more 
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competitive market are more likely to be privatized first because they are more likely to 
become financial burdens to the local governments due to their slim profit margins. 
Although a higher degree of market liberalization may cause SOEs’ performance to 
deteriorate, it may also promote more private interests and capabilities to privatize local 
SOEs. Hence, a SOE may be more likely to be privatized if it operates in a more 
competitive market environment. 
 
To quantify the causes of privatization in China, net asset per worker, ratio of 
number of xiagang workers to that of total employees, and percentage of workers 
employed by private enterprises in each province are constructed to measure a firm’s 
performance, worker redundancy and market competition, respectively. Net asset per 
employee is calculated as net asset of a firm divided by its total number of employees. 
When a Chinese SOE undertook restructuring reforms, current employees of that SOE 
were either retained or let go and became redundant workers. The retained workers would 
continue to work with full compensation. They are thus named “working employees” or 
“on-duty workers” in this study. The workers who are let go normally become “xiagang” 
or layoff. Different from being laid off, in which case a worker’s ties to the firm may be 
entirely severed, a “xiagang” worker refers to one who is no longer actively working but 
still receiving minimum benefits from firms. To account for degrees of market 
liberalization in each province, the total number of employees working at private sectors 
in each province covered in the survey is collected from the National Bureau of Statistics 
of China database. A higher ratio of private employees to the total working employees in 
a province indicates a higher degree of market liberalization.  
 
To meet the orthogonality condition, the instrumental variables are constructed 
with one period lag of the aforementioned performance, redundancy and competition 
variables. The rationale of using lagged values as instrumental variables is threefold. First, 
a firm’s performance, worker redundancy and competition that it faced from the previous 
period is more likely to help  determine its privatization in the current period, but less 
likely to affect its current productivity. That is, 0),(
1
=
− itit
IVcorr ε . Second, the 
endogeneity in Equation (2) caused by the first-differencing can be addressed. Recall if 
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),(
1−itit
privcorr ε is significantly positive, then a better-performing firm is more likely to 
be chosen for future privatization. Thus, the first-differenced terms )(
1−
−
itit
privpriv and
)(
1−
−
itit
εε are also correlated. When the lagged values of performance, redundancy and 
competition are used to instrument the first-differenced privatization term, our 
endogeneity concern is then on the possible correlation between 
1−it
IV and )(
1−
−
itit
εε , 
which should be close to zero. This assertion is substantiated by an over-identification 
test in the next section. Third, by including the lagged instrument variables, the omitted 
variable bias can also be addressed.  
 
Moreover, instead of taking first-difference of instrumental variables, Wooldridge 
(2001) suggests that instrumental variables used in a first-differenced panel estimation do 
not have to be first-differenced themselves. Since there are only seven years in our panel, 
using lagged first-differenced instrumental variables will cost us two years of data and 
subsequently decreases the degree of freedom of our estimation significantly. Therefore, 
only the level values of performance, redundancy and competition are used as 
instruments in this study. For the same reason, only one lag of instruments is considered.  
 
Based on Equation (2) the final specification of the estimation equation can be 
shown as follows: 
(3)  )(')()()(
11312111 −−−−−
−+−+−+−=−
ititwitititititititit
wwprivprivkkllyy ββββ
 
)()('
11 −−
−+−+
itititityr
yearyear εεβ
 
 Where, the included endogenous variable is )(
1−
−
itit
privpriv ; the included instrumental 
variables are )(
1−
−
itit
ll , )(
1−
−
itit
kk , )(
1−
−
itit
ww , and )(
1−
−
itit
yearyear ; the excluded 
instrumental variables are 
1−it
eperformanc ,
1−it
redundancy , and 
1−it
ncompetitio . 
)(
1−
−
itit
εε  follows a normal distribution with mean zero and variance 2εδ  , but is not 
assumed to be distributed independently. The model allows arbitrary heteroskedasticity 
and intra-cluster correlations. An instrumental variable general method of moment (IV-
GMM) suggested by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002) is adopted to estimate Equation 
(3).  
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6. Empirical Tests and Findings 
 
 By estimating Equation (3) with IV-GMM, we can study the impacts of 
privatization on Chinese firms’ productivity not only on the year of conversion but also 
on multiple post-privatization periods. In addition, the effects of partial privatization and 
a variety of different private ownerships on firm’s productivity are also examined with 
fixed-effects estimations. As alternatives to privatization, the effectiveness of some non-
ownership-change reforms on productivity changes among the remaining SOEs is further 
evaluated. Lastly, to conclude this section, some policy implications on Chinese SOEs 
restructuring based on our findings are discussed.      
 
6.1 Tests for Endogeneity and Heteroskedesticity 
To justify the adoption of IV approach in this study, a Hausman endogeneity test 
is carried out to compare a consistent estimator (IV estimator) with an efficient estimator 
(OLS estimator). The test statistic is reported in Table 6. The OLS estimators are 
obtained with a pooled OLS estimation with Equation (2). The IV estimators are retained 
after a two stage least square (2SLS) estimation based on Equation (3). The null 
hypothesis is that the IV estimators are not systematically different from the OLS 
estimators. As Table 6 shows, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis at 10 percent 
significance level. Thus, there are variables correlated with Equation (2)’s disturbance 
terms and treatments for endogeneity are necessary and desired.  
 
Table 6 Hausman Specification Test for Endogeneity 
)9(~)ˆˆ()ˆˆ()'ˆˆ(
21 χββββ ββ OLSIVOLSIVOLSIV −Ω−Ω− −  
Null hypothesis: 
 consistent estimator (
IV
βˆ ) is not systematically different from  inconsistent estimator 
(
OLS
βˆ ) 
 
Chi-square statistic: 15.090             P-value 0.084 
Note: 
IV
βˆ is the instrumental variable estimator and estimated by two stage least squares. 
OLS
βˆ is the 
ordinary least square estimator. 
IVβΩˆ and OLSβΩˆ are the estimated covariance matrix of IV and OLS 
estimators. The degree of freedom of chi-square is 9. 
 
21 
 
To address potential endogeneity problems, instrumental variable approach poses 
as a natural choice. By carefully choosing exogenous instruments, this approach can 
ideally produce efficient and consistent estimators. Among all IV estimation strategies, 
the 2SLS approach has been popular because, unlike GMM, 2SLS is exactly identified. 
Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002) suggest that with absence of heteroskedasticity, a 
2SLS IV estimator tends to be more efficient than a GMM IV estimator. However, they 
also suggest that if the homoskedasticity assumption is violated, a GMM IV approach 
would be more preferable. Hence, to decide which IV strategy is more appropriate for the 
model here, a Pagan-Hall heteroskedesticity test is implemented. The test statistic is 
reported in Table 7. The test is based on the estimated residuals of Equation (3) after a 
2SLS estimation. The null hypothesis is that the IV estimation’s disturbances are 
homoskedastic. A chi-square statistic of 25.501 rejects the null hypothesis at 5 percent 
significance level. Therefore, an IV-GMM approach is favored and used to estimate the 
effects of privatization on firms’ productivity growth. Nevertheless, the adoption of the 
IV-GMM approach inevitably raises questions of identification. To address these, tests 
for identification is discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 7 Pagan-Hall Test for Heteroskedesticity in the IV estimation 
Null hypothesis: IV estimation’s disturbances are homoskedastic 
 
Pagan-Hall test statistic: 25.501   P-value 0.030 
Note: This is a test for heterksedesticity for instrumental variable estimations. The test statistic has a chi-
square distribution with 14 degree of freedom. 
     
6.2 The impacts of privatization on firms’ productivity (IV-GMM results) 
The validity of instruments is vital for the success of IV estimations. As discussed 
earlier, a qualified instrument must meet two requirements: relevance and orthogonality. 
On the relevance aspect of instruments, we consider a group of variables representing the 
firms’ performance, market competition, and worker redundancy. These variables have 
been widely regarded as causes of privatization in China. After numerous regressions of 
possible instruments on the dummy variable of privatization, three variables emerge as 
our choice of instruments: net asset per worker, the ratio of the total number of 
employees in private sectors to the total number of working population in each province, 
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and the ratio of xiagang workers to the total number of employees at each firm. A pooled 
OLS is estimated and the estimation specification is shown as follows. 
 
(4) )()()()(
1
2000
1996
210 it
j
itjjititit
emanagesharddyrwassetgemployeegprivd βααα ++++= ∑
=
  
          
ititit
softbudgetddebtdburdensd )()()(
432
βββ +++  
           
itititit
ncompetitioredundancyeperformanc υγγγ ++++
−−− 131211
 
 
The dependent variable in Equation (4) is the first-difference privatization dummy. 
The independent variables include all explanatory variables from the structural model 
(Equation (2)) as included instruments and the lagged performance, redundancy and 
competition variables as excluded instruments. Table 8 reports the estimation results. All 
excluded instruments are significant at 10 percent significance level and consistent with 
findings from previous literature. Firms with higher net asset per employee or facing 
increased market competition are more likely to be privatized whereas higher worker 
redundancy hinders privatization decision. As Wooldridge (2002) points out, level 
variables may tend to be weakly correlated with first-differenced variables. Such weak 
correlations between instruments and endogenous variables may cause the IV estimation 
to produce biased estimators. Therefore, a F-test and Kleibergen-Paap Lagrangian 
multiplier tests (K-P LM) are implemented to examine the relevance of the excluded 
instruments. These tests have been recommended by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002). 
The null hypothesis of the F-test is that the estimated coefficients of the excluded 
instruments are not jointly different from zero. The test statistic is shown in the upper 
rows of Table 9 and the null hypothesis is rejected at 10 percent significance level. The 
null hypothesis of the K-P LM test is that the coefficient matrix of Equation (4) does not 
have full rank, an indication of weak correlation between the excluded instruments and 
the endogenous variable. Thus, failing to reject the null hypothesis would suggest that the 
model is underidentified. Similar to the F-test results, The K-P LM test results reinforce 
our choice of instruments by rejecting the null hypothesis at 10 percent significance level. 
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Table 8 Causes of Privatization  
(Pooled OLS of Equation (4)) 
Pooled OLS 
Dependent variable: D(private) 
constant 0.004 
(0.008) 
g(on-duty workers) 0.003 
(0.004) 
g(asset) -0.048* 
(0.027) 
D(year 1996) -0.002 
(0.004) 
D(year 1997) -0.005 
(0.008) 
D(year 1998) 0.011 
(0.013) 
D(year 1999) 0.008 
(0.013) 
D(year 2000) 0.002 
(0.009) 
D(manager share) 0.013*** 
(0.001) 
D(social burdens) -0.01 
(0.012) 
D(excessive debt) 0.004 
(0.005) 
D(soft budget) 0.000 
(0.000) 
lag (competition) 0.439* 
(0.213) 
lag (redundancy) -0.018* 
(0.008) 
lag (performance)  0.001* 
  (0.000) 
Number of obs: 1184 
R-square: 0.507 
Note: This table presents the pooled estimation of Equation (4). g, D and lag refer to growth, first 
difference and lag term, respectively. It is used as specification for F and K-P LM underidentification tests. 
Competition is the ratio of private sector employees to total employees in each province. Redundancy is the 
ratio of xiagang workers over total employees of a firm. Performance is the net asset per employee. Robust 
standard errors are in parenthesis and *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels 
respectively. 
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Table 9 Underidentification Test for IV-GMM Estimation 
F-test of excluded instruments  
H0: the estimated coefficients of instruments are jointly equal to zero 
F test statistic: 2.38   Prob > F: 0.069  
 
Kleibergen-Paap LM test for underidentification 
H0: Matrix of reduced form coefficients does not have full rank (underidentified) 
Chi-square statistic: 7.16    P-value: 0.067 
Note: This table reports two underidentification tests for the excluded instruments based on Equation (4). 
The F-test is a joint test and the K-P test is a Lagrangian multiplier test. Reduced form refers to Equation 
(4). The F-test and K-P LM test both have 3 degrees of freedom. 
 
Table 10 reports results from estimating Equation (3) with IV-GMM, the 
preferred model specification, and illustrates the impacts of privatization on firms’ 
productivity in China, the central focus of our interest. First, to one’s surprise, it is found 
that productivity growth rate at privatized firms is not significantly higher than that at 
SOEs in the year of conversion. This finding may be largely attributed to transitory costs. 
Jefferson and Su (2006) argue that the impacts of privatization may not be immediately 
observable since the initial gains may be offset by the costs of transition. If ownership 
transformation does matter to firms’ efficiency improvement, its effects would more 
likely emerge later in the post-privatization periods.  
 
Second, all reform measures but management incentive are shown to improve 
firms’ productivity significantly. Easing workforce redundancy and excessive debts may 
contribute to productivity growth by 37.3 percent and 5.3 percent, respectively. In 
addition, the effect of hardening soft-budget constraint on productivity growth is found to 
be significant although the magnitude is small. Third, regarding the impacts of production 
factor growths on firms’ productivity growth, labor input has on average boosted output 
growth by 20.8 percent from 1995 to 2001 and the comparable contribution of capital 
input on productivity growth is higher, with the average of 43.5 percent impact during the 
same period.  
Third, coefficients from time dummies indicate a “V” shape change in firms’ 
productivity growth in China from 1996 to 2001. The growth rates of productivity have 
continuously decreased by 8, 10.8 and 21.8 percents in China from 1996 to 1998, 
respectively. The decreasing trend of productivity growth continued in 1999, but it 
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slowed to 11.1 percent. Such persistent falls of productivity growth rates may be 
attributed to the tightened monetary policies in China from 1995 to 1998. With erratic 
economic growths from 1980s to 1995, China experienced serious inflation in 1993-1995. 
Inflation rate in China had increased to 14.7 percent from 6.4 percent a year before and 
peaked at 24.1
7
 percent in 1994. To tame the inflation, Chinese government dramatically 
restricted state-owned banks lending practice. As a result, inflation dropped sharply after 
1995 and so did the GDP growth rate. Chinese GDP growth rates declined steadily from 
10.9 percent in 1995 to 7.6 percent in 1999 and subsequently slowly recovered to 8.4 
percent in 2000.
8
 Taking these policy changes into account, our estimation results on time 
dummies have well captured the impacts of these overall economic slowdowns.  
  
                                                 
7 The data are from 2009 World Economic Outlook by International Monetary Fund.  
8 The data are from World Development Indicators by World Bank. 
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Table 10 Impacts of Privatization on Firm’s Productivity 
Dependent variable OLS 2SLS IV-GMM 
g(output)    
constant -0.031
*
 -0.064* -0.068
**
 
 (0.018) (0.038) (0.034) 
d(private) 0.038 3.699 3.648 
 (0.159) (3.251) (2.902) 
g(on-duty workers) 0.245
***
 0.234
***
 0.208
**
 
 (0.056) (0.069) (0.085) 
g(asset) 0.272
***
 0.442
***
 0.435
***
 
 (0.074) (0.176) (0.166) 
d(year 1996) -0.106
***
 -0.091* -0.088
**
 
 (0.040) (0.052) (0.038) 
d(year 1997) -0.137
***
 -0.105 -0.108* 
 (0.050) (0.068) (0.058) 
d(year 1998) -0.191*** -0.215*** -0.218*** 
 (0.051) (0.063) (0.068) 
d(year 1999) -0.099** -0.109* -0.111* 
 (0.047) (0.057) (0.065) 
d(year 2000) -0.043 -0.040 -0.043 
 (0.037) (0.045) (0.052) 
d(manager shares) -0.002 -0.051 -0.050 
 (0.003) (0.044) (0.039) 
d(social burdens) -0.424
***
 -0.380
**
 -0.373* 
 (0.131) (0.158) (0.207) 
d(excessive debts) -0.037
**
 -0.054
**
 -0.053
**
 
 (0.017) (0.025) (0.024) 
d(soft budget) 0.000 0.000 0.000
**
 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Obs. 1194 1184 1184 
R-square 0.069   
Root MSE  0.698 0.692 
Note: OLS reports the pooled OLS first-differenced estimation results. 2SLS reports a standard 2 stage 
least square estimation results without adjusting for heteroskedesticity and intra-cluster. IV-GMM reports 
the baseline instrumental variable general method of moment results based on Equation (3). Standard 
deviations are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. 
 
Lastly, a Hansen J test is used to examine if the excluded instruments are 
correlated with the structural model’s disturbance term. The null hypothesis of the test is 
that the excluded instruments are not orthogonal to the model disturbance. Table 11 
shows the test statistic. The chi-square statistic is 0.568, which fails to reject the null 
hypothesis. We also conduct a C-test to see if any other variables in the structural model 
(Equation (2)) should be considered as endogenous in addition to the privatization 
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dummy. The test results indicate that only the privatization dummy should be considered 
as endogenous and receives IV treatment. 
Table 11 Overidentification and Endogeneity Tests 
Overidentification Test 
H0: Instruments are not orthogonal to the model disturbance 
Hansen J statistic: Chi-square 0.568       P-value 0.753 
 
Endogeneity Test 
H0: the endogenous variable d(private) can be treated as an exogenous variable 
C-test statistic: Chi-square 3.064     P-value 0.080 
Note: The overidentification jointly tests if all instruments (included and excluded) are correlated with the 
error term. The endogeneity test examines if the chosen endogenous variable df(private) can be 
appropriately considered as an endogenous variable. These two tests are documented by Baum, Schaffer, 
and Stillman (2002). 
  
6.3 The dynamics of privatization 
Besides the contemporaneous effects of privatization on firms’ productivity, the 
dynamics of privatization, post-privatization in particular, are also worth exploring. 
Although privatization may fail to exhibit any significant impacts in the year of 
conversion due to various causes, its effects may begin to appear after the early transitory 
periods. To estimate the effects of privatization in the post-transition periods, we 
construct two time dummies, 1
st
 year and 2
nd
 year after privatization, to replace the 
privatization dummy in Equation (3) and estimate the equation with IV-GMM. The 
estimated coefficients are reported in Table 12 and the results from a pooled first-
difference OLS model are also presented in Table 12 for comparison. Being limited by 
the short time series of the data, only two years post-privatization effects are studied. The 
IV GMM estimation finds that firms’ productivity has, on average, increased by 214 
percent after the first year of conversion. However, the effects faded out and became 
negative and insignificant in the second year after privatization.  
 
Moreover, we analyze whether or not and to what degree the endogeneity 
problems have been controlled by the preferred IV-GMM estimation approach. The test 
strategy is adopted from Brown et al. (2006). Brown et al. (2006) illustrate that without 
properly addressing selection bias, firms tend to exhibit significant improvements on their 
performance in the immediate years prior to privatization because managers have 
incentives to make their firms look better to attract future private buyers or owners. On 
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the other hand, such anticipatory effects should disappear if selection bias is sufficiently 
controlled. Following this strategy, we replace the privatization dummy in Equation (3) 
with two time dummies: one year and two years prior to privatization. The estimation 
results are presented in Table 13. All pre-privatization dummies are significantly positive 
in the years prior to privatization in the first-difference OLS specification whereas no 
anticipatory effect is found in the IV-GMM specification. This result further indicates 
that OLS estimation may pose serious selection bias problems and that the endogeneity 
problems have disappeared after the model is estimated with the IV GMM approach. 
 
    Table 12 Effects of Post-Privatization on Firms’ Productivity  
Note: This table shows the post-privatization effects on firms’ productivity and its growth. All variables in 
the OLS specification are in levels. All variables in the IV-GMM specification are in first-differences. 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels 
respectively. 
  
 Pooled first-differenced OLS IV-GMM 
 Dependent: g(output) 
 
Dependent: g(output) 
 
Constant -0.137 -0.048
**
 
 (0.274) (0.020) 
d(1
st
 year after private) 0.117 2.140
*
 
 (0.093) (1.006) 
d(2nd year after private) 0.145 -1.191 
  (0.118) (4.610) 
g(On-duty workers) 0.245*** 0.249*** 
 (0.056) (0.090) 
g(Asset) 0.266
***
 0.150 
 (0.073) (0.144) 
d(Year dummies) yes yes 
   
d(Manager shares) -0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
d(Social burdens) -0.420
***
 -0.347
*
 
 (0.131) (0.184) 
d(Excessive debts) -0.038
**
 -0.050
**
 
 (0.017) (0.021) 
d(Soft budget) 0.000 0.000
**
 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
N 1194 1184 
adj. R
2
 0.070  
Root MSE  0.696 
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Table 13 Effects of Pre-Privatization on Firms’ Productivity  
 Pooled OLS IV-GMM 
 Dependent: output 
Independents in levels 
Dependent: g(output) 
Independents in first differences 
Constant -0.122 -0.066
*
 
 (0.275) (0.040) 
1
st
 year before private 0.219
*
 3.046 
 (0.120) (4.386) 
2
nd
 year before private 0.206
*
 1.385 
 (0.123) (13.251) 
On-duty workers 0.345
***
 0.203 
 (0.041) (0.138) 
Asset 0.677
***
 0.103 
 (0.040) (0.221) 
Year dummies yes yes 
   
Manager shares 0.002 0.040 
 (0.002) (0.058) 
Social burdens -0.782
***
 -0.414 
 (0.108) (0.289) 
Excessive debts -0.068
***
 -0.015 
 (0.010) (0.028) 
Soft budget 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) 
Obs. 1562 1184 
adj. R
2
 0.706  
Root MSE  0.709 
Note: This table shows the anticipation effects of privatization. All variables in the OLS specification are in 
levels. All variables in the IV-GMM specification are in first-differences. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. 
 
6.4 Partial privatization and different types of private ownership 
Among different ways of reforming SOEs, partial privatization has been 
highlighted as a favored model for SOE restructuring by Chinese policymakers. Chinese 
government believes that partial privatization can introduce new private capital and 
technology to ailing SOEs, but at the same time help to preserve the state control. 
Without much radical reform, social stability can also be maintained at a partially 
privatized SOE. In line of this belief, Amess, Du and Girma (2009) find that unlike full 
privatization, partial privatization tends to cause job creation and that partial privatization 
also results in wage increase for employees. However, the effectiveness of partial 
privatization on productivity is still uncertain. Indeed, a partial privatization may 
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stimulate a firm’s performance in many ways, such as technological change, profitability, 
and corporate governance, etc. On the other hand, with only minor shares sold to private 
investors, the state may continue to exercise substantial influence over firms’ operation 
and thus fail to boost reformed SOEs’ efficiency.  
 
To provide further insights on this issue, the effects of partial privatization are 
estimated. A firm is considered being partially privatized if the total private shares in a 
firm exceeds 0 percent but are equal to or fewer than 50 percent. An IV-GMM approach 
based on Equation (3) with the remaining SOEs is first considered to address the possible 
endogeneity problem. The endogeneity test results (C-test) show that the partial 
privatization dummy is not endogenous. As a result, the IV approach is probably not 
necessary. Nonetheless, a Hausman test still warns the possible presence of endogeneity 
and favors fixed-effects approach. The fixed-effects results for partial privatization are 
presented in Table 14 along with results from OLS. Without controlling for endogeneity, 
the OLS results indicate a significant and positive effect of partial privatization whereas 
partial privatization becomes insignificant after individual effects are controlled for in the 
fixed-effects estimation. To examine the dynamics of partial privatization, two post-
partial privatization binary indicators are also included in the fixed-effects estimation and 
none of them appears significant. In sum, partial privatization probably should not be 
regarded as an equal alternative to full privatization because it fails to exhibit any 
significant impacts on SOEs’ productivity improvements.  
 
In addition to partial privatization, the effects of four different types of private 
ownerships are shown in the lower portion of Table 14. These four categories of private 
ownership are insider, outsider, domestic and foreign privatizations, respectively. Insider, 
outsider and domestic, foreign are estimated separately in two estimations with the same 
set of explainable variables as in Equation (3). Table 14 shows that there is no 
contemporaneous effect from any type of private ownership. However, when post-
privatization dummies (two years after privatization) are included (not shown here), 
productivity at SOEs privatized by insiders has increased by 27 percent with 10 percent 
significance level after the first year of conversion. Nonetheless, this effect quickly fades 
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in the second year after conversion. Previous literature has found that the effects of 
insider privatization are mixed at most. Li and Rozelle (2003) argue that performances of 
insider privatized firms are dependent on the sale price paid by the insiders in China. 
Firms owned by insiders who paid price exceeding the book value more likely will 
perform better. Blanchard and Aghion (1996) study privatization in Eastern European 
countries and find that insider ownership actually impedes further desirable restructurings. 
 
The significant effects of insider privatization in our study may suggest several 
explanations. First, after aligning property rights with corporate governance, firms’ 
efficiencies are improved dramatically because managers and workers become better 
motivated. The positive effects quickly fading out in the following periods reflects some 
inherent flaws of insider privatization, such as lack of new funding, higher wages and 
more importantly diffused ownerships (Estrin and Rosevear (2003) pp.462-465).   
 
Table 14 Effects of Partial Privatization and Different Private Ownerships on Firms’ 
Productivity 
 OLS FE 
Dependent variable: output   
Partial privatization 0.006* 0.007 
 (0.003) (0.007) 
   
Insider privatized -0.293 0.121 
 (0.173) (0.212) 
Outsider privatized 0.103 0.012 
 (0.108) (0.168) 
   
Domestic privatized -0.050 0.022 
 (0.099) (0.148) 
Foreign privatized 0.485 0.237 
 (0.297) (0.365) 
Note: This table shows the effects of partial privatization and insider, outsider, domestic and foreign 
privatization. Partial privatization refers to that the total private shares in a firm ≤50%, but ≥0%. So, a 
partially privatized firm is still considered as a SOE. Insider, outsider and domestic and foreign privatized 
are firms in which insider, outsider, domestic and foreign shares exceed 50 percent, respectively. So, these 
firms are considered as privatized. All estimations in this table are done based on Equation (2)’s 
specification with the privatization binary indicator replaced by private shares or insider and outsider 
privatization dummies or domestic and foreign privatization dummies. Standard deviations are in 
parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels respectively. 
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6.5 Non-ownership-change restructurings 
The retreat of state control on SOEs has been slowed down dramatically in the 
past decade. Imai (2006) quotes the cost of financing restructuring, the role of the State as 
the dominant shareholder, and the balance between the state’s and managers’ interests as 
major constraints of motivating deeper reforms. Thus, keeping and managing some SOEs 
have become increasingly attractive to Chinese government. Mattlin (2007) also closely 
examines the latest attempts by the state to retain and manage large SOEs. By adopting 
some efficiency-oriented non-ownership-change restructurings, the state hopes that the 
remaining SOEs can not only survive but thrive in this new economy. As such, most of 
SOEs have been forced to go through at least one form of non-ownership-change 
restructuring during the survey period. However, the impacts of restructurings without 
relinquishing state ownership on SOEs’ productivity are still largely unknown.  
 
To shed lights on the productivity effects of non-ownership-change restructuring, 
we use a fixed-effects model with data excluding privatized firms. The model 
specification can be written as 
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where restructurings include internal restructuring, bankruptcy, IPO, employee 
shareholding, open sales, leasing and joint venture. The results are reported in the first 
two columns in Table 15. The OLS results are presented for comparison purpose. In the 
fixed effects model, none of the non-ownership-change restructuring policies is 
significant. However, all production factors and time dummies exhibit predicted signs 
and are also significant. One possible explanation to the insignificance of the 
restructuring variables is that these restructuring efforts are primarily targeting at the 
reallocation of property rights and thus they do not directly affect firms’ efficiency if no 
further steps are taken to address issues like managerial incentives, social burdens, 
excessive debts or soft-budget constraints. Thus, without controlling these reform 
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measures, non-ownership-change restructuring by itself may not be as effective as the 
policy makers think.  
To test the validity of this argument, we revise Equation (5) by taking into 
account of the aforementioned reform measures. The results are shown in the last two 
columns of Table 15. Among all reform measures, the coefficients of social burdens and 
excessive debts appear to have negative effects on productivity improvement at 1 percent 
significance level. More importantly, leasing, as a non-ownership restructuring, increases 
SOEs productivity by 55 percent and this result is significant at 10 percent significance 
level. Nonetheless, all other non-ownership-change restructurings continue to show 
insignificant effects on productivity. It seems that the effectiveness of various non-
ownership-change restructurings is different and that there is an optimal sequence for 
non-ownership reforms to be truly effective. Without reducing a SOE’s social obligations 
and easing its excessive debts first, any non-ownership-change restructuring efforts may 
end up in vain. If these two problems are appropriately addressed before any reforms to 
take place, leasing SOEs to investors may be a more rewarding strategy if the priority of 
policymakers is to revitalize firms’ productivity. 
 
Table 15 Effects of Non-Ownership Restructuring on Firms’ Productivity 
 OLS FE OLS FE 
Dependent 
output 
without other 
reforms 
without other 
reforms 
with other reforms with other reforms 
On-duty worker 0.609
***
 0.503
***
 0.319
***
 0.362
***
 
 (0.026) (0.033) (0.035) (0.056) 
Asset 0.454
***
 0.484
***
 0.757
***
 0.518
***
 
 (0.023) (0.056) (0.032) (0.080) 
1996 -0.179
**
 -0.161
***
 -0.183
**
 -0.159
***
 
 (0.080) (0.044) (0.092) (0.059) 
1997 -0.255
***
 -0.260
***
 -0.219
**
 -0.196
***
 
 (0.081) (0.045) (0.090) (0.060) 
1998 -0.244*** -0.317*** -0.201** -0.243*** 
 (0.082) (0.047) (0.091) (0.064) 
1999 -0.202** -0.285*** -0.160* -0.189*** 
 (0.083) (0.049) (0.092) (0.068) 
2000 -0.106 -0.252
***
 -0.068 -0.148
**
 
 (0.084) (0.051) (0.094) (0.071) 
2001 -0.036 -0.201
***
 -0.038 -0.164
**
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Non-Ownership Restructurings 
     
 (0.086) (0.054) (0.097) (0.076) 
Internal Res 0.113 0.096 -0.049 0.123 
 (0.101) (0.097) (0.122) (0.136) 
Bankruptcy -0.199 -0.072 -0.342
*
 -0.022 
 (0.154) (0.177) (0.206) (0.299) 
IPO 0.533
***
  0.380  
 (0.178)  (0.512)  
Shareholding 0.588
***
 0.087 0.260 0.111 
 (0.116) (0.130) (0.158) (0.203) 
Open sales 0.481
**
 0.208 -0.531 0.111 
 (0.222) (0.242) (0.397) (0.506) 
Lease 0.304
**
 0.143 0.185 0.549
*
 
 (0.139) (0.154) (0.201) (0.297) 
Joint venture 1.151***  0.744**  
 (0.279)  (0.300)  
 
Other Reform Measures 
     
Manager shares   0.043 0.010 
   (0.028) (0.030) 
Social burdens   -0.986
***
 -0.499
***
 
   (0.088) (0.153) 
Excessive debts   -0.100
***
 -0.040
***
 
   (0.008) (0.015) 
Soft budget   -0.000 0.000 
   (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -0.524*** -0.035 -0.284 0.793 
 (0.132) (0.410) (0.177) (0.645) 
Obs. 2285 2285 1407 1407 
adj. R
2
 0.617  0.708  
Within R
2 
 0.225  0.209 
Note: This table shows the effects of non-ownership restructuring and other reform measures on remaining 
SOEs’ productivity. The estimations are based on Equation (2) and only remaining SOEs are considered. 
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. *, **, *** indicate the 10%, 5%, and 1% significance levels 
respectively. 
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7. Conclusion 
Privatization has gained momentum in China as a major alternative reform 
strategy to revitalize ailing SOEs after it received endorsement from Chinese government 
in 1995 with the policy of “retain the large and let go of the small”. After more than a 
decade of reform, findings on the effects of privatization on firms’ efficiency, however, 
are still mixed. To contribute to this ongoing inquiry, this paper chooses to focus on the 
impacts of privatization on Chinese SOEs’ total productivity with a panel data of 863 
Chinese firms in 11 cities from 1995 to 2001.  
 
Previous studies on Chinese privatization have been mostly haunted by 
endogeneity problems. The sources of the endogeneity may come from selection bias, 
omitted variables or even first-difference treatment in a panel context. To address these 
concerns, privatization dummy at the year of conversion is treated as an endogenous 
variable in this paper and instrumented with three chosen exogenous variables. These 
three instrumental variables measure a firm’s performance, worker redundancy and 
provincial market liberalization. These factors have been widely documented in previous 
studies as causes of privatization in China. After a series of  tests, these instruments are 
proved to be relevant to the endogenous variable and orthogonal to the disturbance term 
in the structural model. Due to the presence of heteroskedesticity and intra-clustering, the 
model is estimated with a first-difference IV-GMM approach. Further tests confirm that 
our results are free from endogeneity bias. 
 
Our results indicate that privatization fails to boost firms’ productivity in the year 
of conversion, but it does yield significant and positive impacts until one year after 
privatization takes place. The insignificance can probably be explained by transition costs 
that occur in the first year of privatization. Moreover, some reform measures are also 
controlled in the privatization effect estimation because Chinese SOE reform policies and 
our survey data both suggest that Chinese firms, regardless of ownership, may all face 
some challenges and hindrances that impede efficiency improvement. These hindrances 
may range from social burdens resulting from benefit payments to retired employees, 
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excessive debts, and soft-budget constraint to management incentives. Without 
controlling these variables, the coefficient of privatization is likely biased upward.  
 
In addition, we find that partial privatization leads to insignificant improvement in 
efficiency at SOEs. To investigate how various private ownerships affect firms’ 
productivity all privatized firms are disaggregated into insider and outsider or domestic 
and foreign privatized firms. Except insider privatization being found to lead to higher 
productivity, none of other private ownerships shows impacts on productivity.  
 
Lastly, the effects of several non-ownership-changes restructuring on productivity 
are also examined among those firms that remain as SOEs. The motivation of this 
exercise is largely due to the fact that Chinese government has become more interested in 
preserving state control in some strategic SOEs in recent years of reform. Mattlin (2007) 
and Imai (2006) analyze this new phenomenon and contend that some non-ownership-
change restructuring attempts have been made at remaining SOEs to improve their 
viability without losing state control. In our evaluation of the effectiveness of this 
strategy, we find that non-ownership-change restructurings may become wasteful if soft-
budget constraint and excessive debts problems are not fully addressed first. Further, 
even if a non-ownership-change reform is properly executed, its effect on productivity is 
still much lower than that from privatization.  
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